The Wall Street Journal - June 25, 2007 - Greg Ip - "Amid Financial Excess, a Revival of Austrian Economics"
Does the U.S. risk repeating the mistakes that led to the Great Depression? The Bank for International Settlements‘ annual report, released Sunday, suggests that it does, and offers a remedy steeped in the doctrine of Austrian economics.
In the 1930s adherents of the “Austrian school,” named for its Austrian-born proponents Ludwig von Mises, Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek, argued the Great Depression represented the unavoidable remediation of misallocated credit and overinvestment in the 1920s. The Austrian school largely failed to become orthodoxy as first Keynesian demand management appeared to end the Depression and later monetarism blamed the Depression on inadequate attention to the money supply.
Austrian economics, however, has enjoyed a minor revival in the last decade, most prominently at the Basel, Switzerland-based BIS, which has few formal banking duties but is an important talking shop (it is sometimes called the “central bankers’ central bank.”) The BIS’s leading “Austrian” is a Canadian, William White, the head of the bank’s monetary and economic department and sometimes-rumored successor to retiring Bank of Canada governor David Dodge. In a 2006 paper Mr. White wrote that under Austrian theory, “credit creation need not lead to overt inflation. Rather…. the financial system … create[s] credit which encourages investments that, in the end, fail to prove profitable.” This leads to an “an eventual crisis whose magnitude would reflect the size of the real imbalances that preceded it [because] the capital goods produced in the upswing are not fungible, but they are durable. Mistakes then take a long time to work off.” He argued that in recent decades, “financial liberalisation has increased the likelihood of boom-bust cycles of the Austrian sort.”
Although the concluding chapter of the BIS’s latest annual report, released Sunday, never mentions the Austrian school, it is suffused with its influence. “Virtually no one foresaw the Great Depression of the 1930s, or the crises which affected Japan and Southeast Asia in the early and late 1990s, respectively,” it begins. “In fact, each downturn was preceded by a period of non-inflationary growth exuberant enough to lead many commentators to suggest that a ‘new era’ had arrived.”
It notes that “the prices of virtually all assets have been trending upwards, almost without interruption, since the middle of 2003.” While fundamental economic improvements are at the root, “the market reaction to good news might have become irrationally exuberant. There seems to be a natural tendency in markets for past successes to lead to more risk-taking, more leverage, more funding, higher prices, more collateral and, in turn, more risk-taking… [S]uch endogenous market processes … can, indeed must, eventually go into reverse if the fundamentals have been overpriced.”
Apart from financial imbalances, the report argues the world economy also displays dangerous misallocations of capital. In its “recent rates of credit expansion, asset price increases and massive investments in heavy industry, the Chinese economy also seems to be demonstrating very similar, disquieting symptoms” to Japan in the 1980s. “In the United States, it is the recent massive investment in housing that has been unwelcome from an external adjustment perspective. Housing is the ultimate non-tradable, non-fungible and long-lived good.” In other words, the U.S. could be stuck with a lot of houses that are hard to sell to each other and impossible to sell to foreigners, and won’t need replacement for a long time.
What does the BIS say central bankers should do? Essentially, relax their single-minded focus on price stability, and tighten monetary policy when “a number of indicators — not just asset prices but also credit growth and spending patterns — are simultaneously behaving in a manner that indicates increasing exposures.” In other words, when easy credit is fueling excesses, raise interest rates to end the party, even if inflation is quiescent.
In practical terms, few central banks are ready yet to heed the Austrian prescription. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke spent a lot of his life arguing just those sorts of prescriptions helped bring about, and deepen, the Great Depression. (See, for example, his 2002 speech, “Asset-Price ‘Bubbles’ and Monetary Policy.” Under him, the Fed remains focused on inflation. The European Central Bank has recently reasserted the importance of money and credit growth in its deliberations, but its policy for practical purposes also remains focused on inflation. The Bank of Japan comes closest to sharing the BIS view and has routinely cited the risk overinvestment as a reason to raise rates, but it has recently stopped tightening as inflation remains near zero.
As Mr. White has acknowledged, the Fed can rightly argue its practice of leaving bubbles alone and cutting rates to mitigate their bursting appears to have worked well. The post-stock bubble rate cuts may have in turn created a housing bubble whose consequences haven’t fully played out. But the strength of economic growth since 2002 appears to have placed the burden of proof on advocates of an alternative policy.
This isn’t to say Fed officials are unsympathetic to some of the BIS’s diagnoses. Some, in particular New York Fed president Tim Geithner, regularly warn that risk-taking is at an extreme and a reversal could trigger a self-reinforcing spiral of price declines and asset sales. Yet, having thought it over, they’ve concluded anything the Fed does with interest rates to address this risk would likely make matters worse.
"The credit boom is built on the sands of banknotes and deposits. ... If the credit expansion is not stopped in time, the boom turns into the crack-up boom; the flight into real values begins, and the whole monetary system founders." —Ludwig von Mises, Human Action
Thursday, June 25, 2015
Flashback: "Amid Financial Excess, a Revival of Austrian Economics"
Introduction: The article re-posted below was written by Greg Ip and published in the Wall Street Journal on June 25, 2007. Although it was written eight years ago, many of the trends have repeated themselves. Specific mention was made of China's economic woes at the time. We can only speculate what would have happened if China had faced its problems eight years ago, instead of piling up a huge mountain of debt to avoid the problems until today.
Wednesday, June 24, 2015
Re-Interpreting China's New Economic Foreign Policy.
Over the past year, China’s increased drive to re-align international institutions has led many observers to view these moves as further indicators that China will surpass the United State’s influence in Asia specifically, but also other emerging markets. In July 2014, China led the introduction of the New Development Bank, a financial institution created to counter the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the Brazilian, Russian, Indian, Chinese, and South African spheres of influence. In May 2015, Chairman Xi began a tour of South America as part of a program called International Capacity Cooperation. Although many see these actions as signs of China’s growing strength, they should actually be seen as signs of China’s weakness.
For members of the New Development Bank, the stated goal is to allow each member to have investment opportunities outside of their countries (mainly China), and have access to capital for domestic infrastructure projects (mainly everyone but China). The more important function deals with currency bailouts. As the Washington Post explained:
On the real economy front, China’s investment in and exports to developing countries are being promoted by Chairman Xi through the International Capacity Cooperation program. Xinhua explained the focus of this proposal:
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For members of the New Development Bank, the stated goal is to allow each member to have investment opportunities outside of their countries (mainly China), and have access to capital for domestic infrastructure projects (mainly everyone but China). The more important function deals with currency bailouts. As the Washington Post explained:
"BRICS countries have also created a $100 billion Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), meant to provide additional liquidity protection to member countries during balance of payments problems."The BRICS were the biggest beneficiaries of the Quantitative Easing program launched by the Federal Reserve. As yields were artificially pushed down, borrowers could access more artificial credit and savers had to seek out more risky investments in the developing world. Now, the monetary authorities of these countries may understand that as this flow of artificial credit slows or reverses, they will be hit the hardest. The Contingency Reserve Arrangement could possibly slow down the process once it begins.
On the real economy front, China’s investment in and exports to developing countries are being promoted by Chairman Xi through the International Capacity Cooperation program. Xinhua explained the focus of this proposal:
"The government has issued a list of prioritized sectors in which it wishes to enhance such cooperation, including steel, non-ferrous metals, construction materials, railways, electric power, chemicals, textiles, automobiles, telecommunications and machinery."These sectors received much of the new credit that was created by the People’s Bank of China in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Now, they are dealing with excess debt and low demand for all the capacity they brought online. Instead of being seen as China’s growing strength in the world, they should be seen as recognitions by the Chinese authorities that China overbuilt capacity and will run out of dollars when it has to repay its debts.
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Monday, June 22, 2015
Will the China Century End in 2019?
The
United States has dominated the global economy for much of the Post-World War
II Era. Its dominance has come
from the sheer size of the U.S. economy.
No other nation has yet been able to surpass the gross domestic product
of the United States at any time during the period. To understand China’s rising status in the world, we must
view gross domestic product in another way.
We
can imagine annual gross domestic product as the economy standing still at the
end of the year. The United States
has always been the dominant economy and will continue to be dominant for the
foreseeable future. However, if we
measure economic dominance by the new amount of gross domestic product in
dollar terms, we can see economic change in progress. We can safely assume that new gross domestic product has
more impact on the world economy than recurring gross domestic product. This would explain China’s rapid rise
in economic influence over the last few years, despite being significantly
smaller than the United States.
According
to the International Monetary Fund, between 1981 and 2001, the United States’
nominal gross domestic product increased by about $388 billion per year. By comparison, China’s nominal gross
domestic product increased by about $51 billion per year. Not only was the United States economy
much larger than China’s, it was adding much more new gross domestic product to
the world economy. The United
States was the unchallenged world economic superpower.
In
2007, even before the Global Financial Crisis, that changed. That year, China added $781 billion
worth of new gross domestic product against the $622 billion created by the
United States. As of the most
recent numbers for 2014, this trend has continued.
Even
more astonishing is China’s proportional contribution to world gross domestic
product. In 2009, when the world
lost $3.2 trillion in economic activity, China still added $470 billion worth
of new gross domestic product. In
2012, the world added $1.2 trillion in new gross domestic product, and China’s
contribution to that number was $900 billion. That means that in 2012, for every dollar the world made
from new economic activity, China added about 75 cents. As China adds one impressive year of
economic results to another, it is no wonder than many people expect the 21st
century to be the China Century.
It is surprising that China does not have an even greater say in world
economic affairs already.
The
challenge, though, is that as China’s growth slows, it will become increasingly
difficult to continue this. Any
economy that is twice the size of another only has to grow by slightly more
than half of a competitor to overtake its new output. If China is expected to grow by 7.4% for the year, the
United States really only has to grow by 4.0% or so to overtake China’s new
contribution to gross domestic product.
Whether
intentionally or not, the International Monetary Fund projects this scenario to
play out in 2019. Their
projections foresee China’s economy growing from $14.0 trillion in 2018 to $14.8
trillion in 2019, meaning $800 billion in new economic activity, whereas the
U.S. is expected to grow from $21.1 trillion in 2018 to $22.0 trillion in 2019,
meaning $900 billion in new economic activity. In that case, China will grow by 6.0% against 4.2% for the
United States, but the United States will contribute $100 billion more new
gross domestic product to the world economy.
Unfortunately
for China’s long-term prospects, the only country that was able to outpace the
United States for more than one year during the Post-World War II Era was Japan
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Between 1986 and 1988, Japan added $1.6 trillion in new gross domestic
product, whereas the United States only added $900 billion. Alas, between 1989 and 2013, Japan added
$1.9 trillion in new gross domestic product to the world economy compared to
$11.5 trillion worth of new gross domestic product created by the United States
during the same period.
Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund’s projections
assume that China’s gross domestic product will continue to experience positive
growth. During the Asian Financial
Crisis, the combined economics of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the
nations hardest hit by that episode, declined 7.4% in 1997 and 35.8% in 1998. If from a starting point of $10.0
trillion at the end of 2014 China were to experience a similar event in 2015
and 2016, it would erase $748 billion one year and $3.3 trillion the next year. That is more economic pain than the entire
world experienced during the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, but instead it
would only affect one country.
Even with the International Monetary Fund’s best-case scenario, the
China Century will end in 2019.
Sunday, June 21, 2015
2015-05 Relative Price Trends
Consumer prices increased 1.2% year-over-year in May, whereas purchasing prices fell 5.5% over the same period. This marks China’s 42nd month of economic contraction.
Last week, the Financial Times ran an article titled "China Central Bank Admits Defeat in War on Deflation." The Chinese people no longer have to worry about their renminbi purchasing power. The Chinese central bank has shut down its printing presses. Could it be that the managers at the People's Bank of China read Murray Rothbard's work, and finally agreed that the price of everything should drop to five mao?
Unfortunately, no. When the Financial Times says "admits defeat", they really mean "revised down its inflation estimate to half the level targeted by Beijing[.]" When they say "deflation", they really mean "full-year CPI forecast [of] 1.4 per cent, down from the 2.2 per cent projection published in December. " In our upside-down world of financial journalism, purchasing power is bad and deflation is low-digit inflation.
At some point, the world will realize that central banks cannot guide the economy more rationally than private actors can. That point has not been reached. In fact, most mainstream commentators are calling for more of the same. According to the same Financial Times article:
Still, the gap between the inflation forecast and the government's official target suggests officials are well aware that monetary easing measures adopted so far are not enough to boost price growth to the government’s desired level.There does not seem to be any discussion, either in the financial media or at monetary authorities, as to why the monetary easing measures adopted so far have been wildly successful at igniting one of the largest bull markets in history, but cannot lift consumer prices higher than 2.00%. Could it be that central banks are not omniscient directors of the economy, nor is money neutral?
Saturday, June 20, 2015
China Joins the Developed World in Monetary Insanity
China’s stock markets just experienced the worst week since 2008. The Shanghai Composite and Shenzhen Composite dropped 13.3% and 12.7%, respectively, over the week that ended June 19.
Over the last two weeks, $9.1 billion has been pulled out of Chinese stock funds, despite the Chinese authorities approving about 50 initial public offerings per month, double the rate of previous months. The higher valuations are driven by the People’s Bank of China cutting interest rates three times and reserve requirements twice since November. In a recent Wall Street Journal article, the root cause of China’s economic woes were hinted at, but not intentionally:
Over the last two weeks, $9.1 billion has been pulled out of Chinese stock funds, despite the Chinese authorities approving about 50 initial public offerings per month, double the rate of previous months. The higher valuations are driven by the People’s Bank of China cutting interest rates three times and reserve requirements twice since November. In a recent Wall Street Journal article, the root cause of China’s economic woes were hinted at, but not intentionally:
“Morgan Stanley’s Mr. Garner said that despite the current policy-easing cycle that began in November, China’s economy is worse off compared with where it was in 2009, when massive stimulus efforts led the economy to bounce back strongly.”Stimulus caused the current economic issues; it did not resolve the economic issues of the past. Without irony, the author also made this statement:
“Some analysts now think Beijing is more likely to step in with further stimulus, helping prop up the markets.”Did monetary stimulus not work? Try more monetary stimulus.
Friday, June 19, 2015
Divergent Provincial Growth.
As China pumped new money into the economy to avoid the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, most of that new money flowed into fixed capital investment (capacity), natural resource excavation, and the property market. The north-eastern region of China led on industrial expansion, Shanxi’s coal market exploded, and Hainan’s real estate market attracted investment from all over the country. Now, those provinces are beginning to feel the adjustment as previous mal-investments are liquidated. According to Bloomberg, China’s slow down is not affecting all provinces equally.
“Plagued by overcapacity and a property slowdown, the industrial northeastern Liaoning province expanded just 1.9 percent from a year earlier, according to a report by 21st Century Business Herald. Nearby Heilongjiang and Jilin are the fourth and fifth slowest growing regions as China's rust belt gets rustier. … Northern Shanxi's dependence on coal weighted its growth to 2.5 percent, the second slowest. … The southern island of Hainan -- China's equivalent of Hawaii -- slowed to 4.7 percent growth in the first quarter from over 8 percent last year. Its pristine air and tropical climate failed to attract more home buyers, with property sales slumping.”By comparison, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Tibet, three provinces that did not receive as much of the artificial credit that was created over the past few years, are still growing at double digit rates. The monetary stimulus that was meant to delay the re-adjustment is not flowing back into the real economy.
“As college students and pensioners queue for hours to open share-trading accounts, the country's financial capital of Shanghai benefited from the stock market's boom. Financial services contributed 16.6 percent to the city's economy in the first quarter -- higher than the most recent numbers in New York City, Hong Kong and Singapore.”Unfortunately, as the real economy adjusts, the continued monetary expansion that was implemented to delay the process has only created more mal-investments, but this time in the country’s financial markets. Eventually, the process of artificial credit creation will catch up with itself.
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
Renhe Commercial Holding's Risky New Business
In our search for the company that will set off contagion in China’s capital markets, Renhe is a prime candidate. It could be another company that the Chinese financial authorities allow to go bankrupt for purely economic reasons. The timeframe for this to happen would be March 2016. According to the New York Times:
For Renhe, the business of converting bomb shelters into shopping malls has turned costly and unprofitable. The company has accumulated debt, reporting net losses and negative cash flow for the past several years. With only about 900 million renminbi, or about $150 million, in cash on hand, Renhe will have to find a way to repay or refinance a $1 billion bond it sold to international investors, which comes due for repayment in nine months.Renhe is an example of a Chinese company that has borrowed from overseas markets, but is unable to cover debt payments because of purely economic reasons. The most recent default in the offshore U.S. dollar debt market, Kaisa, is considered to be because of political or criminal reasons, not specifically economic reasons. Renhe management is currently planning a new business strategy to leave the bomb-shelter-turned-shopping-mall business and improve its cash flow by purchasing a farmers’ market business. However, the details of the deal hint that it could be grounds for the authorities to consider Renhe’s future financial situation the result of improper transactions. According to the same New York Times article:
Renhe’s deal for eight farmers’ markets in six cities across China is meant to generate minimum annual profit from rents of 625 million Hong Kong dollars, or about $80 million. But it comes with a twist. Renhe is buying the markets from one of its directors, who is also the wife of the company’s chairman and controlling shareholder.What could go wrong?
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